File No.:

Title: Still tangible evidence of Operation Market Garden's failure
Investigation made at: Several locations in the Netherlands and online databases
Period Covered: 17-26SEP1944
Date: 20JUL2025
 Case Classification: Location of Historic Events
Status of Case: Open Case
 

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Fig.: General Browning (right with beret), commanding officer of 1st Airborne Corps, has all the time in the world to pose with American Tech Corporal Matulovich of the 82nd Airborne Division's artillery near 1st Airborne Corps Headquarters in Groesbeek.
REASON FOR INVESTIGATION
Operation “Market Garden”, the Allied combined arms assault into the Netherlands with the intention to establish a bridgehead across the Rhine for a ground army to advance into the heartland of the Third Reich, in September 1944, keeps fascinating historians and tacticians. The operation is one of those great “might have been” military stories, complete with seemingly endless “what if "-questions about what it was that caused its eventual failure.
What were the contributing factors of Operation “Market Garden” and what was counteracting the mission?
Moreover: what can still be found as evidence of these factors today?
This agency mapped some of the “Still tangible evidence of Operation Market Garden’s failure”.

SYNOPSIS:
Categories of Errors
In general three categories of errors that led to the failure op Operation “Market Garden” can be identified.
1) Errors in the planning phase
Author Antony Beevor, in his 2018 book “Arnhem: the battle for the bridges, 1944” (Penguin Books Ltd, ISBN 9780670918676), argues that the operation was already flawed from the inception.
2) Errors in the execution phase
Author William Buckingham’s 2019 book “Arnhem: the complete story of Operation Market Garden” (Amberley Publishing, ISBN 10 1848681097 ) focusses on (mostly British) command errors during the operation.
Enter the endless “what if” discussions. “If only the weather had been more favorable, or XXXth Corps had kept advancing, or Nijmegen bridge had been taken in the first days of the operation”. Cornelius Ryan’s 1974 book “A Bridge Too Far” (Simon and Schuster, ISBN 10: 024189073X) is the best example of this school of thinking.
3) Errors in understanding the opponent’s strength
Feldmarschall Helmut von Moltke, who led the Prussian Army to victory during the Wars of German Unification in the 1800’s, noted that “no plan survives contact with the enemy.” As usual, soldiers have a sharper way of expressing the same thought: “The enemy has a vote.”
This category of errors emphasizes on underestimating the German strength and not foreseeing the enemy’s response.
The best literature on this subject can be found in the works of Dutch author Peter Berends in his 2003 Dutch language work “Een andere kijk op de slag om Arnhem, De snelle Duitse reactie”(Uitgeverij Aspect, ISBN 90-5911-008-0) and his fellow countryman Marcel Zwarts’ excellent “Einsatz Arnheim, German armoured units and their opponents at Arnhem 1944” (MZS Publishing, ISBN 978-90-834813-0-2) in English and published in 2024.

We will elaborate on each of these three categories and explain several contributing and counteracting military factors of the operation. When available, we present evidence of these factors that can still be found today.


1. Errors in the planning phase
At the strategic level, Operation “Market Garden” reflected the uncertainty that permeated Allied planning at this stage of the war.
The Allied inability to secure the port of Antwerp in Belgium caused enormous logistical problems. The “Red Ball Express” truck convoys, all the way from the artificial Mulberry harbor in Normandy and the port of Cherbourg to the north of Belgium, illustrate this challenge of logistics. The German 15th Army managed to keep the Scheldt estuary (and therefore Antwerp) closed for too long. But to make matters worse, the Allies let this whole army escape in a German version of the Dunkirk retreat. A force of ten divisions was redeployed to the Netherlands and the German Ruhr area, where it could make all the difference to the German response to Operation “Market Garden”.

Factor Single Main Supply Route
Operation “Market Garden” was a very ambitious mission. It featured many moving parts and relied on a single highway as the Main Supply Route. The British XXXth Corps gave the Lommel to Arnhem highway the tactical name “Club Route” but the paratroopers of the American 101st Airborne Division, who dealt with several German attempts to cut the Allied corridor, dubbed it “Hell’s Highway” for obvious reasons. The vulnerable route north gave the enemy a constant opportunity to thwart the operation: cut the road and stop the advance.

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Fig.: Map showing the Operational Plan for "Market Garden"
with single Main Supply Route and Phase Lines
indicating Nijmegen sould be reached on D+2 (Tuesday 19SEP1944)
and Arnhem on D+3.

Factor Intelligence
The ease and speed with which the Allies had been able to give chase to the Germans after the breakout of the Normandy bridgehead had led to the assumption that the enemy was all but defeated.
Added to these weaknesses are numerous poor choices made during the planning phase. Best known are the decision to spread the airborne lifts over several days, the selection of drop- and landing zones too far from the objectives, and the choice not to deploy a “coup de main” assault on the Arnhem road bridge by inserting a raiding party in its close proximity. This had been proven successful when capturing “Pegasus Bridge” in Normandy in the night before D-Day three months earlier.
Tangible Evidence of The presence of a DZ\LZ in close proximity to main objective suitable for insertion of an assault element:

1) In situ: photos taken from DC3 on21MAY2011 of southern Rhine river bank at Arnhem
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Fig.: Embankments south of the Rhine river road bridge at Arnhem in 2010. After these photos were taken (by this agency; see Battle Study #21) the open fields south of the river banks have been deepened to serve as alluvial plains in times of high water marks rendering this area far less suitable for an air assault.


Fig.: Embankments south of the Rhine river road suitabel for a coup de main air assault.
Note Flak-positions in open fields of flood plain which have to be overtaken prior to second wave air lifts.

2) Diagrams comparisons of LZ at Pegasus Bridge and imaginary coup-de-main landing at Arnhem Bridge.

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Fig.: Left: British Horsa gliders landed near "Pegasus Bridge" near Benouville in Normany in the night of 5-6JUN1944
Right: FABRICATED image of what it would look like if Horsa gliders had landed south of Arnhem bridge on 17SEP1944


It is often said that Operation “Market Garden” was essentially an intelligence failure.
British intelligence officer Major Brian Urquhart, not related to Major-General Urquhart the commander of 1st Airborne Division, warned about the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, but was ignored as can be read in Case File #19. It is however a fact that the greater Arnhem area was not infested with German armor when the air assault started.

Tangible Evidence of Limited presence of German armor in the Arnhem area on 17SEP1944:
1) From the NIOD archive in Amsterdam: Messages from the Dutch Underground sent shortly before the start of Operation “Market Garden” only indicate the presence of the 9th “SS-Panzer-Division Hohenstaufen” in the area north of Arnhem.

Fig.: Typed message either sent from occupied Netherlands to Londen via microfilm or in encrypted Morse radio messages informing: "IJssel Line.14 September. Both sides of IJssel river between Zutphen and Arnhem and in Achterhoek region SS. division Hohenstaufen stop. Division staff presumably in Doetinchem stop other staff elements at Beekbergen and Epse stop. Above line Loenen-Zutphen are 1900 men of this divison".

2) From the National Archives in the UK:ULTRA Intercepts relating to ENIGMA messages about deployment of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in Arnhem area
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Fig.: Intercepted and decyphered message of 05SEP1944 ordering 9th and 10th SS Panzer Division to rest and refit in Arnhem area.

It was the German ability to reinforce the units already in the area that formed the greatest threat.
The overall plan was too fragile to withstand the first opposition met once the starting phase line was crossed and airborne troops started landing. It lacked the flexibility to deal with the inevitable setbacks such as the ambush at the Dutch frontier and the destruction of the Wilhelmina Canal bridge at Son both on the first day of the operation. And, worse, to deal with an active enemy who did not react as Allied planners had assumed.
Tangible Evidence of Unpredicted enemy delaying Advance of “Garden”:
1) In situ: German ambush positions along N69 south of Valkenswaard
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Fig.: Indentations in forest floor along MSR (now Highway N69) where German soldiers operating anti-tank equipment laid in wait for the lead elements of British XXXth Corps on 17SEP1944.


Fig.: Lidar image of the same forest floor today.
2) In the Wings of Liberation Museum in Best: British vehicle parts found along N69 south of Valkenswaard.
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Fig.: Battlefield relics donated to the Wings of Liberation Museum in Best, the Netherlands
marked where they were found (proximity to hectometer distance signposts).

2. Errors in the execution phase
Most likely the largest of errors in the prosecution of the operation was the delayed capture of the Waal river road bridge at Nijmegen. The main effort of the airborne troops was to capture all bridges en route to Arnhem with “thunderclap surprise”, which absolutely meant top priority immediately after landing. Unfortunately the task and prioritization of capturing Nijmegen bridge was given and discussed in verbal order; not in writing.
It should be noted here that the US 82nd Airborne Division had received an incorrect intelligence report about large numbers of German tanks hidden in the Reichswald forest on the eastern flank of the Division’s drop- and landing zones. This was also the area where First Allied Airborne Corps commander General Frederick “Boy” Browning planned to establish his headquarters .
These factors resulted in prioritizing the capture of the Groesbeek Heights at the expense of the immediate advance in force into Nijmegen.

Tangible Evidence of Questionable command decision:
Moving entire HQ 1st Airborne Corps to field at expensive of transport capabilities that could otherwise have been deployed for war fighting elements
1) In close proximity to the LZ of 1 Airborne Corps HQ: monument with Horsa Glider parts in Groesbeek
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Fig.: Monument othe corner of  17 Septembers Straat and  Parachutisten Straat in Groesbeek honoring the landing of 1st Airborne Corps Headquarters.
Note "V"-shaped element made from landing gear wheel suspension of one of the Horsa gliders bringing in General Browning's staff.
Also note bullet holes in the tubing.

 
Fig.: Monument on Koning Juliana Weg in Groesbeek honoring General Browning's Headquarters.

Although XXXth Corps can be accused of lacking a sense of urgency in their advance on 18SEP1944 (D-Day+1), the bridge they needed to cross (Nijmegen) was still in enemy hands.
Their participation in capturing that bridge had not been pre-planned, and XXXth Corps had to spend much of its offensive power in support of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions.

Factor Weather
The original plan was that the remainder of 1st Airborne Division would land in the second airborne lift no later than 1000 in the morning of 18SEP1944 but cloudy conditions prevented air assets from taking off before midday. It was not until between 1500 and 1600 that they arrived over the drop- and landing zones.
After 19SEP1944, 7 of the next 8 days had poor weather and all air operations were cancelled on 22 and 24SEP1944. This left the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions without their artillery for days and the latter division without its glider infantry regiment for 4 days. The British 1st Airborne division had to do without its 4th Brigade until five days into the operation.

Factor Armored Corps Doctrine (strictly daylight operations with infantry support)
Armored assaults in darkness are difficult and the lead elements of the Guards Armored Division tanks had little infantry support.
Above all, they were restricted to that one elevated highway. A continued charge past Nijmegen might have pushed the German defenders off balance; but a swift and bloody repulse appears the most likely end state.

Factor Close Air Support
The contribution of the Allied air component was at times perfect. For all the undoubted bravery of the transport crews, there were problems in supplying the trapped division at Arnhem, and delivering tactical air support. All too often, especially at Arnhem, Allied tactical airstrikes were unavailable. Sometimes it was the weather, though more often it was the inability to run both types of mission simultaneously in such a small area. When the Typhoons could get in, however, they were devastating. More close air support might have compensated the slow advance of XXXth Corps.
Tangible Evidence of The deployment of Close Air Support:
Found in situ and in possession of this agency: Two 20mm Hispano cannon casings presumably from strafing runs by Hawker Typhoons, found near Commonwealth cemetery along N69 south of Valkenswaard by Battle Detective Antoine in close proximity to the German anti-tank ambush location.
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Fig.: 20 millimeter shell casings found by Battle Detective Antoine close to the N69 South of Valkenswaard; presumed to be from 20 mm Hispano autocannons in British Hawker Typhoons
providing close air support on 17SEP1944.

Factor Command and Control
Commanding Officer of the 1st British Airborne Division, Major- General Roy E. Urquhart, was trapped in a townhouse on the line of contact with the enemy in Arnhem. He spent hours out of touch with his own headquarters. For the whole division, an already complicated situation was made far worse because of this.
 
Tangible Evidence of Command and Control Error
In situ: house on Zwarteweg 14 in Arnhem where Major- General Roy E. Urquhart was trapped in the attic with sign “Urqhuart House”
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Fig.: Townhouse on No. 14 Zwarteweg in Arnhem where Major-General Roy E. Urquhart
and two other British Airborne officers had been hiding for hours on 17-18SEP1944.
Note sign "Urquhart House".

General Browning, supposedly commanding all of the airborne troops from his headquarters in the woods near Groesbeek, proved inept and out of reach. Montgomery failed to control the situation at all, while Horrocks was probably too ill to be in command.

Exemplary is also the touristic battlefield tour made by general Ridgway who started his journey with General Brereton. Stuck in Eindhoven during bombing raid in Eindhoven on 19SEP1944. Left car and Brereton behind and proceeded to hinder Gavin in his HQ just when the urgency of taking Nijmegen Bridge became apparent.

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Fig.: Now&Then comparisson of the corner of August Snieders Laan in Eindhoven where General Brereton's staff car was abandoned and from where General Ridgeway arranged for his own transportation to the 82nd Airborne Division's Area of Responsibility.

On the opponent’s side we’ve seen in “Kussin Junction” the choice of Feldkommandant Generalmajor der Infanterie Friedrich Kussin to visit the front-line troops of SS-Haupsturmführer Josef Krafft which turned out to be a fatal leadership decision.

Nevertheless the ad hoc battle command of Feldmarschal Model, Generalkommissar für das Sicherheitswesen Rauter and SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Bittrich took over operations, and concurred.

Factor Signals Communication
The radios flown in to Arnhem were mostly not up to the task and failed repeatedly.

Factor Wet Gap Crossing Capabilities
The problem of boats, bridging materiel and river crossing capabilities is often mentioned. A look at the map shows that this was likely to be a key element of the operation. Surely there were not enough boats and amphibious vehicles, but these were too slow and unsuitable for a wet gap crossing under fire anyway. This wasn’t an airborne infantry task either.
Tangible Evidence of The Challenges of advancing on a single MSR with multiple wet gap crossings:
1) in situ: photo series of RNLA constructing Bailey Bridge across Wilhelmina Canal at Son on17SEP2014.
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2) in situ: photo series of Waal River Crossing reenactment 19-20-21SEP2024.
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3) In situ: The pontoon bridge across the river Rhine at Arnhem, which had become obsolete with the completion of the road bridge in 1935, was an objective of the paratroopers who were also tasked with taking the latter river crossing. On 17SEP1944 the paratroopers of LT-COL John Frost found the center section of the bridge on the southern river bank and left the bridge behind.
In a "What-If-"scenario one can discuss what tactical advantages the intact pontoon bridge would have provided the British airborne soldiers. They might have been able to put troops on the southern bank and attack the road bridge from both sides.
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Fig.: Pontoon "GWA 14" for Municipal Works Arnhem No. 14,
which was found in derelict state in 2007 was restored
and sits on the spot where the south end of the pontoon bridge was.
 
Fig.: Left: On an oblique aireal photo taken on 12SEP1944 the center section of the pontoon bridge
can be seen dragged mid-river and away from bridge.
Right: On a vertical  aireal photo taken during the battle (not smoke above the town),
the center section can be seen neatly "parked" on the southern bank.

3. Error in Understanding of Opponent’s strength
During the entire operation, the German defense was highly competent and capable of frustrating the Allied plans. German units remained tactically sharp. The immediate response to the initial Allied airborne assault showed a high degree of initiative on local levels. The troops were well led and, even against elite paratroops, they held their own. This bought the Germans precious time and allowed for defensive positions to consolidate, particularly in Arnhem.
The German situational understanding, planning, organization, and decision-making were exemplary at the operational level. Especially Feldmarschall Walter Model of Army Group B and SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich commanding the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, quickly understood the situation and reacted accordingly. Deploying the troops they had, Kampfgruppen were formed and counter-attacks were already threatening the Allied offensive within 24 hours. This performance makes that of Horrocks and Browning look uninspiring.

Factor Operational Security
On 15SEP1944 the alleged betrayal by Dutch double agent Christiaan “King Kong” Lindemans of an imminent combined arms assault into southern Holland took place. Tasked by Allied command to cross the lines into occupied Holland to inform resistance groups of the imminent operation, King Kong first went to the Generaloberst Kurt Student, in charge of the German defense of occupied Holland. There he told of a planned armored assault in the direction of Eindhoven. Student had King Kong transferred to the Abwehr (Counterintelligence) headquarters in Driebergen to be debriefed indepth. King Kongs double cross betrayal can at least be viewed as another confirmation of what the Germans were already expecting:
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Fig.: From the OB West Tagesmeldebuch 11SEP1944
"Reliable source says invasion is imminent and all precautions are taken in Holland"

Tangible Evidence for the Betrayal of the operation by Double Agent Christiaan “King Kong” Lindemans:
1) In situ: Photos of Lindemans’ grave in Crooswijk.
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Fig.: Christiaan "King Kong" Lindemans' grave today and exhumation of his remains on 17JUN1986.
After examination it was determined that the exhumed remains could indeed be identified as those of Lindemans, that anatomically no cause of death could be identified from the skeleton, and that there were insufficient arguments to demonstrate arsenic poisoning. Everything seemed to indicate that Lindemans had indeed committed suicide.
2) In the NIMH Archives in The Hague: King Kong’s handwritten statement in French of NOV1944.
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Fig.:  Two pages in Christiaan "King Kong" Lindemans' own handwriting in which he only admits to Canadian Field Security that in Driebergen he betrayed his handler Captain Baker and the resistance network he was a member of; nothing about divulging military intelligence.
3) In Boerreé’s book: German report with intelligence from a “V-Mann” which can only be King Kong.
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Fig.: Report in German:
9/15/44
At 10.50 p.m. Fallsch.AOK 1 (Lt. Meyer) reported:
Statements from an undercover agent:
Located in area W Beeringen (near a factory).
Enemy tank gathering of 300 armored vehicles. Tnks are repaired there, should start attack thrusting towards Eindhofen September 16th. The H.Q. of Intelligence Services No. 6 with Cpt. Baker and Cpt Ross is also located there. Both wore cap badge of the 2nd Army.
Furthermore, based on sleeve and cap badges, the following units were identified:
1) 15th English I.D.
2) 45th English I.D.
[handwritten: “September 1st in Italy, operational area unknown (illegible)]
3) 50th English I.D.
4) 11th Arm. Div.
5) Grenadier Arm. Div.
6) Belgian paratroopers in the Diest area by consultation.
Insignia: Blue double wings with light blue feather ends, like a cross section of a rowing boat with a white parachute in the middle.
Based on cap badges, members of the Hampshire and Irish Guards, alongside 1,000 men of the Royal Princess Irene Regt. and Belgian Infantry identified.
It is noteworthy that the command posts are accommodated in mobile command vehicles.
In addition, there also amphibian trucks (2.5 to “Ducks”) are deployed. South of Lommel an airfield, that in the meantime was used for farmland, is repaired by 150 RAF soldiers who were brought there in trucks, an aircraft.
Also noted were: Signals Troops, Mil. Police with red cap.
Signed: Lt. Mackenroth

4) In File KV-2-231 in British National Archives: Transcript of German Intelligence message intercepted by Bletchley Park dated 22AUG1944 of King Kong already relaying intended Airborne Assault towards Maas.
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Fig.: Intercepted and decyphered message of 22AUG1944
5) In situ: Photo building in Driebergen.
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Fig.: Villa Heijdesteijn in Driebergen where the German Frontabwehrtrupp 365 (Front Intelligence Troop) was stationed and where Lindemans provided the Germans with intelligence described in the 15SEP1944 report.
The estate is NOT open to the public.

On 17SEP1944 a Horsa glider with chalk number 413 was forced to make an emergency landing near Dongen because of a broken tow cable. The glider was part of “A” Squadron, No. 8 Group, transporting General Frederick Browning’s headquarters. On landing the crew was attacked by a group of German soldiers and one crew member was killed. After interrogation and having searched the plane, the Germans found a document, probably the day order of the 101st airborne Division. It was handed over to Generaloberst Student who in turn was unable to contact Feldmarschal Model. It was therefor impossible to pass on the information in this document to German commanders in the Arnhem area of operations. But Student himself was now aware of the route of advance of XXXth corps, the drop- and landing zones and the objectives of the 101st. The document also included the transport schedule of 18 and 19SEP1944. Using this information, Kurt Student was able to reorganize his forces.
Factor Most Dangerous Course of Action
Germany’s strategic reaction facilitated the flexible use of military assets. 15th Army units were pulled away from the Scheldt Estuary and provided the bulk of the infantry used to challenge Operation “Market Garden”. Heavy tank battalions were rushed to the area by train. It was Germany’s ability to prioritize these trains, even in late 1944, that meant British and American paratroops with only light anti-tank capabilities, had to deal with Panther tanks and Tiger II’s.


CONCLUSION:
It is the opinion of this agency that the battle was as much influenced by factors of German fighting abilities as it was by Allied tactical errors. Moreover the plan for Operation "Market Garden" had too many "moving parts" in which the failure one task led to a chain reaction of failure.

EXHIBITS:
It is a mystery to this agency that the presence of 9th and 10th SS Panzer division came as a surprise to the men of 1st British Airborne division when reference is made to at least one panzer division in that Area of Responsibility in the Intelligence Summary of the 82nd Airborne Division dated 11SEP1944. Was this intelligence not available to the British and if so; why not?

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Fig.: Annex  1C to Field Order 11 of the 82nd Airborne Division describing in an Order of Battle Summary the Enemy Situation in the Operational  Area:
"It is reported that one of the broken Panzer divisions has been sent back to the area north of ARNHEIM to rest and refit ; this might produce some 50 tanks.

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